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CLEAN DRINKING WATER: A STREAM OF SUCCESS
AND OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORM
Kayla Weiser-Burton*
I. INTRODUCTION
Forty-five years ago, Congress passed the first version of the Safe Drinking
Water Act1 (SDWA or Act). In passing the Act, Congress provided a set of
comprehensive rules to govern the quality of the drinking water being provided by
public water systems (PWSs) across the nation. As originally enacted, the SDWA
defined a “public water system” as a system that provided drinking water to at least
twenty-five people or fifteen service connections for a minimum of sixty days per
year.2 Previous regulations had been limited to water supplied to and on interstate
carriers, vastly restricting the scope of regulated waters.3
In order to achieve safe drinking water, the principle mechanism adopted was
defining enforceable standards for acceptable water quality.4 The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was designated the authority to set those
standards, called maximum contaminant levels (MCLs).5 The primary federal
responsibility was to establish the MCLs and other guidelines to serve as baseline
measures for both state governments and the water suppliers.6
The Act continues to regulate numerous systems today, helping to ensure that
communities have clean drinking water. According to a Congressional Research
Report released in March 2017, the SDWA applies to about 152,700 water systems.7
*
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1
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–j-9 (Suppl. IV 1974) (current version at
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–j-27 (2018)).
2
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 25 YEARS OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT: HISTORY
AND TRENDS 3 (1999) [hereinafter SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS], https://nepis.epa.gov
[https://perma.cc/2GQD-392A] (search “866R99007”).
3
See William E. Cox, Evolution of the Safe Drinking Water Act: A Search for Effective
Quality Assurance Strategies and Workable Concepts of Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 70 (1997).
4
42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (Supp. IV 1974). For purposes of the SDWA, the EPA was defined
as the “Administrator” in 42 U.S.C. § 300f(7) (Supp. IV 1974).
5
Id. § 300g-1(b).
6
See Cox, supra note 3, at 70.
7
MARY TIEMANN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT
(SDWA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 3 (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31243.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB7Z-BMAM] [hereinafter
SDWA SUMMARY].
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Approximately 51,000 of these are community water systems that benefit the same
residences all year.8 These PWSs provide water to close to 300 million people, and
all federal regulations are applicable.9 Over 18,000 PWSs are non-transient, noncommunity water systems, generally serving the same people for more than six
months out of the year, but not year-round.10 The majority of federal regulations
apply to these water systems.11 Lastly, nearly 83,200 other PWSs are transient, noncommunity water systems, providing their own water to transitory customers, such
as rest stops, gas stations, and campgrounds.12 The only applicable regulations are
for those pollutants that pose immediate health risks.13
While the Act has come a long way since its inception, through regulating more
contaminants and providing additional mechanisms to ensure proper water quality,
it is still flawed. This Note will first examine the history of the SDWA, from the first
enactment in 1974 to the current version of the statute, highlighting the major
amendments of 1986, 1996, and 2016. Part III will examine some of the key
successes that have come from the Act and its amendments. Part IV will examine
two instances where the Act still falls short, focusing on the water crisis in Flint,
Michigan and the exemption for oil and gas well operations. Finally, this Note will
offer some suggestions on how to address the shortcomings—specifically, the Act
should (i) mandate updates for failing infrastructure and require more rigorous
monitoring to ensure compliance; (ii) be applied again to regulate the oil and gas
industry; and (iii) regulate more hazardous chemicals.
II. HISTORY
A. Municipal Water Before the SDWA
Water has always been recognized as a fundamental requirement for human
life. Ancient civilizations were either built near water resources,14 or were developed
in some way to harness water from a more distant source. While populations
accepted the importance of water quantity to sustain life, water quality was not

8

Id.
See id. (“These water systems provide water to more than 299 million people. All
federal regulations apply to these systems.”).
10
See id. (noting that 18,718 public water systems are non-transient non-community
water systems, such as schools or factories).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at n.3 (“The EPA’s longstanding policy is to exclude transient systems from
drinking water regulations except for those contaminants, such as nitrate, that the EPA
believes have the potential to cause immediate adverse human health effects resulting from
short-term exposure.”) (citing National Primary Drinking Water Regulation on Lead and
Copper, 65 Fed. Reg. 1950 (Jan. 12, 2000)).
14
SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 1.
9
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always so readily understood.15 As populations continued to grow and communities
became denser, problems with sanitation and pollution arose.16
It was not until the 19th century that scientists began to comprehend the link
between disease and contaminated water. 17 In the 1850s, Dr. John Snow proved his
theory that transmission of disease could occur by drinking contaminated water.18 A
couple of decades later, French chemist and microbiologist Louis Pasteur showed
that food spoiled due to contamination by microbes in the air.19 He went on to
develop the “germ theory” of disease,20 arguing that these microbes could transmit
disease through the water supply.21 This theory helped to prove the relationship
between contaminated water and localized disease outbreaks.22
In the early 20th century, scientists’ and engineers’ primary focus concerning
water quality was the removal of pathogens from the public water supply.23 The
federal government began regulating water quality in 1914, when the U.S. Public
Health Service (PHS) set standards for bacteria content in water systems providing
drinking water to interstate carriers.24 While it was not federally mandated, each of
the states individually adopted the same standards to use as guidelines for local
PWSs.25
Congress addressed water pollution across the nation in 1948 by passing the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.26 The original statute “authorized the Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service, in cooperation with other Federal, state and
local entities, to prepare comprehensive programs for eliminating or reducing the
pollution of interstate waters and tributaries and improving the sanitary condition of
surface and underground waters.”27 It also gave authorization to the Federal Works
15

Id.
See id. at 2 (discussing the “germ theory” of disease, which explained how
microorganisms could transit diseases through mediums such as water); see also Linda
Poppenheimer, Clean Water Laws — Prior to Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, GREEN
GROUNDSWELL BLOG (June 24, 2013), http://greengroundswell.com/clean-water-laws-priorto-safe-drinking-water-act-of-1974/2013/06/24/ [https://perma.cc/NPK5-PT7F] (discussing
the various connections made between contaminated water and disease in the 19th century).
17
Poppenheimer, supra note 16.
18
Dr. John Snow, JOHN SNOW INC., http://www.jsi.com/JSIInternet/About/snow.cfm
[https://perma.cc/CC4Z-E26J].
19
Louis Pasteur: The Man Who Led the Fight Against Germs, BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/timelines/z9kj2hv [https://perma.cc/J7DD-CY8V].
20
Id.
21
See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 2.
22
Id.
23
See id.
24
Id.
25
See id.
26
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DIGEST OF FEDERAL RESOURCE LAWS OF INTEREST
TO THE U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE: FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
(CLEAN WATER ACT), https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/fwatrpo.html [https://perma.cc
/6CSA-3LN8].
27
Id.
16
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Administrator to assist municipalities, states, and interstate agencies to construct
treatment plants to treat sewage before discharging it into interstate waters and
tributaries.28
The statute was amended numerous times, most notably in 1972, transforming
the law into the Clean Water Act (CWA).29 These amendments highlight the
objectives of Congress to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”30 One of the most distinguished updates
included the establishment of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES),31 regulating the discharge of pollutants through point sources into a
“water of the United States” through a permit system.32 These permits establish
discharge limits, monitoring requirements, and further provisions to protect water
quality and public health.33 Additionally, the 1972 amendments gave the EPA the
authority to implement pollution control programs, provided funding to construct
sewage treatment plants, and preserved the requirements to establish water quality
standards for surface waters.34
While general water quality regulations increased, there was a growing
apprehension regarding the management of drinking water supplies. The
inadequacies of drinking water regulations came to light in a 1970 PHS study
concerning PWSs.35 The study surveyed 969 PWSs located in nine areas across the
United States, including both large and small systems.36 It found that “[36%] of . . .
individual tap water samples contained one or more bacteriological or chemical
constituents exceeding the limits in the Public Health Service Drinking Water
Standards.”37 Additionally, 56% of the service facilities exhibited physical
deficiencies including inadequate protection of groundwater sources and faulty
disinfection techniques.38
These shortcomings, along with the rising concern of pesticides and other
industrial chemicals reaching drinking water supplies, prompted Congress to pass
the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974.
28

Id.
See History of the Clean Water Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/history-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/C4DH-SHNV]; see also U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 26.
30
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. II 1972).
31
See id. § 1342.
32
See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-basics [https://perma.cc/BDF9-XZNW].
33
See id.
34
See History of the Clean Water Act, supra note 29.
35
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMMUNITY WATER SUPPLY STUDY: SIGNIFICANCE
OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 1 (1999), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.EXE?ZyActionL=Regis
ter&User=anonymous&Password=anonymous&Client=EPA&Init=1 [https://perma.cc/9A
DV-ZCA3] [hereinafter COMMUNITY WATER SUPPLY STUDY].
36
Id. at 5.
37
Id. at 10.
38
Id.
29
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B. The Original SDWA
The primary purpose of passing the SDWA was to study contaminants in
drinking water sources and design maximum level goals for each contaminant in
order to protect consumers.39 The determination of fixed limits for each contaminant
mirrored prior programs, but the sweeping difference was that the limits now applied
to all PWSs above a certain size.40 The Act gave the Administrator of the EPA
(Administrator) the power of oversight and enforcement of the applicable
standards.41
The new standards were divided into two categories, the first of which were the
national primary drinking water regulations (NPDWRs),42 covering substances that
may have an adverse effect on human health. The second category contains national
secondary drinking water regulations (NSDWRs),43 which include substances that
may adversely affect human welfare, including the odor or appearance of the water.
NSDWRs are not enforceable under federal law.44
For each of the NPDWRs, the EPA is required to establish a health goal, defined
as “the level of contaminant in drinking water below which there is no known or
expected risk to health.”45 This standard is the “recommended maximum
contaminant level” (RMCL).46 While the RMCL standard itself is not legally
enforceable, it guides the EPA in establishing the “maximum contaminant level”
(MCL).47 MCLs are legally enforceable and are as close to the RMCL as possible,
taking into consideration both cost and technological feasibility.48
The 1974 SDWA required the EPA to regulate drinking water in two steps, the
first of which was to create interim NPDWRs, largely based on the twenty-eight
PHS standards.49 In addition to establishing MCLs, there were requirements for the
monitoring and analysis of regulated contaminants, record keeping, and a provision
to notify the public if a water system fails to meet the federal standards.50 The second
step was to revise these standards after the National Academy of Sciences reviewed
them in light of the health risks to consumers.51 The first eighteen interim standards

39

See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b) (Supp. IV 1974); SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note

2, at 2.

40

See Cox, supra note 3, at 77.
42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (Supp. IV 1974).
42
Id. § 300f (1).
43
Id. § 300f (2).
44
Id.
45
SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 4.
46
Cox, supra note 3, at 78.
47
Id.
48
See id.; see also SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 4.
49
SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 6.
50
Id.
51
Id.
41
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of 1975 included “six synthetic organic chemicals, ten inorganic chemicals,
turbidity, and total coliform bacteria.”52
The SDWA included additional provisions to ensure the safety of drinking
water. One example is the underground injection control (UIC) program,53
implemented as a response to the lack of federal regulation of groundwater
pollution.54 However, this applied only to the operation of injection wells, and
thereby excluded many potential sources of groundwater contamination.55 A second
example is the sole-source aquifer protection program.56 Aquifers that had received
a special designation due to their important relationship to public health were
provided protection to ensure that federally-funded activities caused them no harm.57
While recognizing that not all provisions were necessarily feasible, the Act
provided for variances58 and exemptions.59 Variances provide exceptions for MCLs
where raw water quality prevents a PWS from complying with the standard, despite
the use of the best available technology.60 A state with primary enforcement
responsibility for PWSs may also grant exceptions to NPDWR provisions requiring
the use of a specific treatment, if that treatment is unnecessary to protect public
health.61 Exemptions provide exceptions to compliance with MCLs or the treatment
requirements if a PWS is unable to comply due to “compelling factors,” including
economic burdens.62 If an exemption is granted, control measures and a compliance
schedule for meeting the NPDWR are required.63 However, neither variances nor
exemptions may be granted if there is an unreasonable risk to human health.64
In administering the Act, the EPA was given the authority to delegate the
primary responsibility for enforcement, or “primacy,” to states, territories, or tribes,
so long as they met specific requirements.65 The EPA provided grants to the states
and assisted in administering their programs.66 “With EPA’s oversight, states with
primacy adopt, implement, and enforce the standards established by the federal
drinking water program to ensure that the public water systems in their jurisdictions
provide consumers with safe water.”67 States require PWSs to collect water samples
52

Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3 (Supp. IV 1974).
54
See Cox, supra note 3, at 79.
55
See id.
56
See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(e) (Supp. IV 1974).
57
Id. § 300h-(3)(a)(1).
58
Id. § 300g-4; see also id. § 300g-2 (a)(4).
59
Id. § 300g-5.
60
Id. § 300g-4(a)(1)(A).
61
Id. § 300g-4(a)(1)(B).
62
Id. § 300g-5(a)(1).
63
Id. § 300g-5(b).
64
Id. § 300g-5(a)(3).
65
See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing the roles of states that
have primacy; at the time this report was published, all states but Wyoming had assumed
primacy and received grants from the EPA).
66
Id.
67
Id.
53
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and have them tested in state-approved laboratories.68 After receiving the results,
states must then determine whether the PWS is in compliance or violation of the
federally mandated standards.69 If it is in violation, the public must be notified.70
In passing the SDWA, there was an assumption that new regulations would be
easily adopted. But in actuality, the next twelve years showed only slow progress,
finally spurring Congress to adopt the 1986 amendments.
C. Amendments of 1986
Between 1975 and 1985, the EPA had only developed regulations for twentythree additional contaminants.71 Aside from wanting to speed up that pace, Congress
also wished to address deficiencies in the implementation of established programs.72
One such deficiency was the increased concern regarding synthetic chemicals from
agriculture and manufacturing, both of which were being detected in water sources
at alarming rates.73
First, the 1986 amendments changed some of the terminology from the original
Act. The approach of having both “interim” and “revised” standards was abandoned
and all existing interim NPDWRs were now designated simply as NPDWRs.74
Additionally, RMCLs were now referred to as MCLGs or “maximum contaminant
level goals.”75
Second, the 1986 amendments required the EPA to set MCLGs and MCLs for
eighty-three specified contaminants.76 Within twelve months, NPDWRs were
required for at least nine of those listed.77 At least forty additional contaminants were
required to have NPDWRs within twenty-four months and the rest had a deadline of
thirty-six months.78 The legislation also required the EPA to establish further
regulations beyond the listed eighty-three contaminants within set timeframes, to
establish additional programs to protect groundwater, and to specify the “best
available technology” for treating each contaminant with a designated MCL.79
68

Id.
Id. at 4–5. There are three main types of violations: (1) MCL violation, when the
level of a contaminant in treated water exceeds the EPA or state’s legal limit, (2) treatment
technique violation, when a PWS fails to treat drinking water in the manner designated by
the EPA, and (3) monitoring and reporting violation, when a system fails to test its waters,
or if it fails to report test results in a timely manner. Id.
70
Id. at 5.
71
See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 7.
72
Id.
73
Id. Another concern was the lack of sufficient control over disease-causing microbial
contaminants. Id.
74
See Cox, supra note 3, at 81.
75
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
76
See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 7.
77
42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
78
Id. § 300g-1(b)(1)(B), (C).
79
See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 7.
69
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Finally, one of the most important revisions was the requirement that lead-free
materials be used to repair or install new PWSs or plumbing systems that provided
water for human consumption.80 Additionally, PWSs were required to notify people
potentially affected by lead contamination from the water, either from lead being
within the water supply or if the water was corrosive enough as to cause the leaching
of lead from the pipes.81 This spurred the passing of the Lead and Copper Rule
(LCR) in 1991,82 requiring PWSs to treat water to prevent the corrosion of lead
pipes.83 Under the SDWA, the LCR determines the action level—the point at which
additional prevention or removal steps are required—for lead of 15 parts per billion
(ppb), even though there is no safe level of lead.84 Specifically, the LCR states that
“[if] lead concentrations exceed an action level of 15 [ppb] . . . in more than 10% of
customer taps sampled, the public water system must undertake a number of
additional actions to control corrosion.”85
D. Amendments of 1996
The 1996 amendments continued to broaden regulations for drinking water in
some regards but also slowed the pace for other regulatory procedures. There was a
general belief that the 1986 amendments had created a “regulatory treadmill” in the
forced establishment of MCLGs and NPDWRs and there was a large demand to slow
that process.86 The practice of maintaining a list of unregulated contaminants as
candidates for regulation and continuing to select some of those candidates remained
the same, but the pace of publishing regulations substantially decreased. 87
One of the big regulatory overhauls shifted focus to a more in-depth scientific
study on setting regulations “based on data about the adverse health effects of the
contaminant, the occurrence of the contaminant in public water systems, and the
estimated reduction in health risk that would result from regulation.”88 The EPA was
required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for each proposed regulation, comparing
the costs charged to water suppliers with the health benefits conferred to the public.89
80

See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-6(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
See id.
82
See 40 C.F.R. § 141 (1991); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. 570/9-91-400,
LEAD AND COPPER RULE FACT SHEET (1995).
83
See id. §141-80(b).
84
ERIK OLSON & KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK, NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WHAT’S IN
YOUR WATER? FLINT AND BEYOND 3 (2016), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/whatsin-your-water-flint-beyond-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G7L-LSW6].
85
40 C.F.R. § 141.80(c)(1).
86
See Cox, supra note 3, at 91.
87
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1996), with 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)
(Supp. IV 1986) (showing the similarity of the 1986 amendments with the 1996
amendments).
88
See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 10.
89
Id. (“Public health protection remains the primary basis for deciding the levels at
which drinking water standards are set.”).
81
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The 1996 amendments also sought to improve public relations by means of
providing accessible information and supporting public participation.90 Starting in
1999, all community water systems were required to prepare an annual water quality
report that included information about the source of the water being provided, levels
of regulated contaminants found in the water, and the known health effects of
contaminants detected above the safety limit.91 If a PWS violated a federal drinking
water standard at any point, it was required to notify its customers of the breach.92
By 2003, states with primacy were required to conduct assessments of water sources
in order to identify threats of contamination and how likely it was for a given water
source to be contaminated.93 The public could assist in these assessments, and the
results had to be made available to the communities.94
There was also a push from the federal government to help the states maintain
compliance. A new federal grant program, titled the Drinking Water State Revolving
Fund (DWSRF),95 was established to give money to the states who, in turn, would
loan it to PWSs to update their facilities and ensure standards were being met.96 Each
state was required to develop a plan for intended use of the grant money and was
required to seek public input.97 Federal grant contributions were also conditioned by
provisions that encouraged compliance with recommended non-mandatory
provisions of the SDWA, including the “development of technical, managerial, and
financial capacity of public systems.”98 In order to receive the full amount of
funding, each state had to ensure new systems had adequate capacity to sustain their
customers and develop procedures for spotting and repairing capacity deficiencies.99
While the 1996 Amendments reeled back the pace of implementing new
regulations, many changes were still made to the benefit of consumers. The increase
of public awareness and involvement was a significant milestone, both simply by
being equitable in informing consumers, and by helping to promote accountability
of the persons or companies maintaining the water systems.

90

See id. at 11 (detailing several reports, assessments, databases, and programs that the
1996 Amendments created in order to improve public access and increase public
participation).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.; see also Cox, supra note 3, at 91.
94
SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 11.
95
Id.
96
Id. (“This federal grant program provides money for states . . . [to] provide loans to
water systems to upgrade their facilities . . . . A portion of each state’s federal grant money
can be set aside for several specific purposes, including acquiring land to buffer drinking
water sources from contamination and funding other local protection activities.”).
97
Id.
98
See Cox, supra note 3, at 92; 42 U.S.C. § 300j-12(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. III 2016).
99
See id. § 300j-12(a)(1)(G)(i), § 300g-9(a), § 300g-9(c).
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E. Amendments of 2016
In December 2016, Congress passed the Water Infrastructure Improvements
Act (WIIN Act).100 Congress’ intent was “to provide for improvements to the rivers
and harbors of the United States [and] to provide for the conservation and
development of water and related resources.”101 While the WIIN Act was broadly
applicable, it resulted in numerous revisions to the SDWA.102
The WIIN Act authorized new grant programs in an effort to help communities,
particularly those in economic distress, to pursue better quality drinking water while
maintaining both their economic and environmental vitality.103 Specifically, the
grant programs do the following: “(1) help public water systems serving small or
disadvantaged communities meet SDWA requirements; (2) support lead reduction
projects, including lead service line replacement; and (3) establish a voluntary
program for testing for lead in drinking water at schools and child care programs.”104
The WIIN Act also authorized $100 million in DWSRFs for communities105 under
the Stafford Act.106
III. ACCOMPLISHMENTS UNDER THE SDWA
The single most important aspect of the SDWA is that it has provided a uniform
set of regulations for drinking water systems nationally. It is no longer up to the
individual states to determine what chemicals should be regulated and how, or to
manage the financing to update and implement new water systems. The Act is
arguably one of the most important pieces of legislation regarding day-to-day usage
of a generalized commodity, something typically taken for granted.
The list of NPDWRs monitored by the EPA today includes a wide variety of
contaminants.107 Sources of these contaminants vary from erosion of natural
deposits, to intentional discharge by various industries, to simply being a byproduct
of drinking water disinfection.108 The sheer number of sources for water pollution is
proof that there needs to be a uniform system in place to monitor drinking water
100

Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, 130
Stat. 1628 (2016).
101
Id.
102
SDWA SUMMARY, supra note 7, at 3.
103
See Sarah M. Beason et al., A WIIN for Water Infrastructure, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 27,
2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=15d2beb6-c301-4182-bd8b-07c57
8dea69c [https://perma.cc/D4DW-9CJY].
104
SDWA SUMMARY, supra note 7, at 3.
105
Beason et al., supra note 103, at 3.
106
42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5123 (Supp. III 2016).
107
See
National
Primary
Drinking
Water
Regulations,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ground-water-and-drinking-water/national-primary-drinking-waterregulations [https://perma.cc/5Z6E-47XU].
108
See id. Additional sources include runoff, decay of cement in water lines and
corrosion of household pipes.
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supplies to ensure its overall quality. Without a systematic approach to
comprehensively address the multitudes of contaminants and their sources, there
would no doubt be some states left with poor standards.
Another achievement under the SDWA is the availability of federal funding,
largely as a result of the 1996 amendments. The DWSRF program is a powerful
funding tool between the federal government and the states, with Congress in charge
of appropriating the funds.109 The EPA provides grants to the states and Puerto Rico
in order to capitalize their loan program, where the states provide an additional 20%
match in funds.110 Direct grant funding is also provided for the District of Columbia
and some U.S. territories.111 “The 51 DWSRF programs function like infrastructure
banks by providing low interest loans to eligible recipients for drinking water
infrastructure projects.”112 Since inception, the state DWSRFs have provided more
than $32.5 billion to water systems, building on a federal investment of $19.1
billion.113 Without this federal assistance, states may not have the funds for the
necessary infrastructure updates.
More recently, the WIIN Act was passed to provide additional financial
assistance to struggling communities. The WIIN Act authorized funding for water
infrastructure improvements, research, as well as reauthorizing various watershed
conservation and restoration programs. In response to the Flint crisis, the EPA
awarded a $100 million grant to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
to fund infrastructure updates, which was funded by the WIIN Act.114 The funding
was provided to help enable Flint to accelerate and expand its efforts to upgrade
infrastructure after their water catastrophe. Combined with the $250 million in state
funds already allocated to Flint, this additional funding will go a long way in helping
make the essential upgrades, especially in regard to replacing or treating corroded
lead pipes.
While the SDWA has made significant improvements in how drinking water is
regulated, there are still present-day concerns that need to be addressed in order to
continue providing clean water. Scientific and technological advances continue to
discover new sources of contamination, as well as new contaminants in our water
systems. In light of this information, the SDWA needs to be amended further.

109
How the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund Works, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
drinkingwatersrf/how-drinking-water-state-revolving-fund-works#tab-1 [https://perma.cc/
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News Release, EPA, EPA Awards $100 Million to Michigan for Flint Water
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IV. WHERE THE SDWA IS STILL FLAWED
A. The Water Crisis in Flint
The city of Flint is located along the Flint River, approximately sixty miles
northwest of Detroit, Michigan.115 Being on the river, Flint was home to a number
of industries in the 1800s, including fur trading, lumber, and the manufacture of
carriages.116 Once the automobile industry took off, Flint again found itself an
industrial hub, with Buick Motor Company founded there in 1903, and General
Motors in 1908.117 Unfortunately, this industrial vibrancy did not last. In 1960, the
population of Flint had peaked over 200,000, and by 2014, it had dropped below
100,000.118 Poverty has since swept through Flint, “with [41.6%] of the population
living below federal poverty thresholds—2.8 times the national poverty rate.”119
The first water system of Flint was established in the late 1800s under private
ownership, and the city later bought it in 1903.120 The Flint River provided an easy
source for water and was treated at a water plant before dispersal to residents.121 To
ensure a reliable water supply, Flint agreed to a long-term water contract with the
Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) in 1967, with water being
supplied from Lake Huron and treated for corrosion control.122
The clean water being supplied from DWSD did not last. Flint took a hard hit
from the 2008 financial crisis, driving Michigan Governor Rick Snyder to declare a
state of financial emergency in Flint.123 In an effort to save money, Flint planned on
purchasing their water from a soon-to-be-built pipeline from Karegnondi Water
Authority, who would still supply the water from Lake Huron.124 In the meantime,
as a temporary solution, the city began to use water from the Flint River.125 While
there is still a question as to who exactly authorized this transition, Howard Croft,
the former director of public works for Flint, asserts that the decision came directly
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520 (2016).
116
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from the Governor’s administration.126 Regardless of who gave the authorization,
this decision had catastrophic effects.
According to a verified class action complaint filed in 2016, Flint government
officials authorized a study of the Flint River in 2011 to determine if it could safely
be used as a primary source of drinking water.127 The results overwhelmingly
indicated that the river water was unsafe without anti-corrosive agents to prevent the
leaching of lead, copper, and other heavy metals from the pipes into the water.128 In
2014, the city emergency manager at the time, Darnell Earley, ordered Flint to begin
pulling their water from the Flint River.129 At the time the order was given, Mr.
Earley had knowledge “that the water was highly corrosive and dangerous to people
and property when distributed without proper anti-corrosive treatment,” a treatment
that had an estimated cost of $60 per day.130
Within days of the switch, water users began to complain that their water was
foul in appearance, taste, and color.131 Flint citizens expressed their concerns over
the following eight months.132 Soon after the Flint River became the primary source
of municipal water, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ)
and Flint officials gained knowledge that the water contained elevated levels of
Trihalomethanes (TTHM).133 Flint water users finally received a notice of the
contaminant breach in January 2015.134 Allegedly, Mr. Earley refused demands for
responsive action, and rejected Detroit’s offer to waive the $4 million reconnection
fee that would allow for reconnection to the Lake Huron water supply.135
The problems with the Flint River only continued to multiply. That summer,
scientists from Virginia Tech tested nearly 300 drinking water samples in Flint.136
Approximately thirty of the samples indicated lead levels of 25 ppb, substantially
exceeding the federally-mandated action level of 15 ppb, and overall, the water from
126
Curt Guyette, Exclusive: Gov. Rick Snyder’s Men Originally Rejected Using Flint’s
Toxic River, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 24, 2016), https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-govrick-snyders-men-originally-rejected-using-flints-toxic-river
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Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, Equitable Relief & Damages at 14, Mays v. Snyder,
No. 16-000017-MM (Mich. Ct. Cl. Jan. 21, 2016)).
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the river was nineteen times more corrosive than the Lake Huron waters.137
Additionally, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, a local pediatrician, began studying the lead
levels in children.138 What she found was startling—the percentage of children in
Flint suffering from elevated lead blood levels had doubled since the water supply
had been switched to the Flint River.139 “[S]tudies of lead exposure in children,
particularly those under the age of 6, indicate an increased risk for damage to
cognition, behavior and employment prospects, also lower I.Q.s, poor impulse
control and decreased lifetime earnings.”140 More than 8,000 vulnerable children
drank the contaminated water.141
Faced with this astounding evidence that the water was unsafe, Genesee County
Health Officials issued a public health emergency in October of 2015, and advised
Flint residents not to drink their tap water.142 Additionally, Governor Snyder ordered
the Flint water supply be reconnected to Detroit.143 The Governor also appointed an
independent task force—the Flint Water Advisory Task Force—to conduct a review
to determine what happened, why it happened, and what was necessary to prevent
another water disaster.144 The report concluded:
The Flint water crisis is a story of government failure, intransigence,
unpreparedness, delay, inaction, and environmental injustice. The
[MDEQ] failed in its fundamental responsibility to effectively enforce
drinking water regulations. The Michigan Department of Health and
Human Services failed to adequately and promptly act to protect public
health. Both agencies, but principally the MDEQ, stubbornly worked to
discredit and dismiss others’ attempts to bring the issues of unsafe water,
lead contamination, and increased cases of [Legionnaires’ disease] to light.
With the City of Flint under emergency management, the Flint Water
Department rushed unprepared into full-time operation of the Flint Water
Treatment Plant, drawing water from a highly corrosive source without the
use of corrosion control. Though MDEQ was delegated primacy . . . the
[EPA] delayed enforcement of the [SDWA] and Lead and Copper Rule,
thereby prolonging the calamity. Neither the Governor nor the Governor’s

137

See id.
See OLSON & FEDINICK, supra note 84, at 10.
139
Id.
140
Mona Hanna-Attisha, Opinion, The Future for Flint’s Children, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/opinion/sunday/the-future-for-flintschildren.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7WVM-VX9G].
141
Id.
142
See Mays Complaint, supra note 130, at 22.
143
Id.
144
See FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 118, at 2.
138

2019]

CLEAN DRINKING WATER

517

office took steps to reverse poor decisions by MDEQ and state-appointed
emergency managers until October 2015 . . . . The significant
consequences of these failures for Flint will be long-lasting. They have
deeply affected Flint’s public health, its economic future, and residents’
trust in government.145
Ultimately, it was not the acts of one individual or agency that caused the disaster in
Flint, but a compounding series of failures.
The Flint water crisis has resulted in a great deal of litigation, which continues
to burden the courts today. The number of persons who have been exposed to Flint
water is in the tens of thousands.146 Perhaps the most troubling fact is that the current
legislation in place should have prevented this from happening—specifically, the
LCR mandates the use of an anti-corrosive agent for suspect waters like those from
the Flint River, regular monitoring of that water system, and immediate public
notification if excess levels of pollutants are found during water sampling. A
comprehensive study of these events in Flint should provide a platform for education
and allow for the expansion of legislation to fill regulatory gaps.
B. The Exception for Oil and Gas Operations
The process known as hydraulic fracturing (fracking) began in the early 1940s
to continue stimulating production from oil reservoirs.147 With technological
advances, including the use of horizontal drilling, fracking is being used to extract
oil and gas in low-permeability formations including coal beds, tight gas sands, and
unconventional shale formations.148 The process of fracking has allowed for the
development of domestic tight oil resources, reducing dependence on international
resources.149 There are nearly 1.3 million oil and gas facilities150 in operation within
the U.S. today. While this method of oil and gas extraction has vastly expanded
domestic production, it also presents an array of concerns, including trespass on
private lands, the triggering of localized earthquakes, and environmental
145
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contamination. In particular, there is growing apprehension regarding the
contamination of groundwater by fracking.
Because of the low permeable nature of the formations being targeted, the basic
idea of fracking is to create fractures within the formation, providing space through
which the natural gas or oil can easily flow to the surface.151 The process starts by
drilling a well and inserting a steel pipe casing into the well bore.152 The casing is
perforated along the targeted zones, allowing the fracturing fluid to flow into the
target zones when injected.153 Once the formation is saturated and cannot absorb any
more, the pressure resulting from the fluids still being injected will cause the
formation to fracture.154 Fracking fluids will include some sort of proppant, a “solid
material . . . used to hold open the cracks made in the reservoir rock after the high
pressure of the fracturing fluids is reduced [including] sand, ceramic beads, or
miniature pellets.”155 Proppants remain within the formation to keep the fractures
open.156
In addition to the proppants, fracking fluids include a large volume of water
and chemical additives.157 Additives will often consist of gels that carry the proppant
into the fractures, biocides to limit bacterial growth, inhibitors against pipe
corrosion, and sometimes acid in order to dissolve rock material to enable easier gas
and fluid flows.158 The exact mixtures of fracking fluids vary widely, depending on
the well. Some percentage of the fracking fluid will return to the surface, called
flowback,159 while some may remain underground. Studies have shown that in some
cases, over 90% of the fluids remain underground.160
These fluids pose a significant risk to drinking water supply. Underground
contaminants, namely methane, can reach drinking water through the fractured rock,
as well as via abandoned wells.161 Contaminants can also reach water supplies
151
Hydraulic Fracturing 101, EARTHWORKS, https://earthworks.org/issues/hydraulic_
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through poorly cemented or completely un-cemented fracking wells.162 The EPA
analyzed a representative sample of oil and gas wells throughout the U.S.,
discovering that 66% of wells had one or more un-cemented regions and that “3%
of wells had un-cemented regions within the depth where well operators reported
there was groundwater—putting them at high risk of contaminating drinking
water.”163
Groundwater can also be contaminated by chemicals being directly injected
into underground sources of drinking water (USDWs).164 In 2004, the EPA released
a final study evaluating the impacts to USDWs by fracking in coalbed methane
reservoirs.165 The report found that approximately 90% of coalbed methane basins
in the country are at least partially located in USDWs.166 There are also reported
cases in which fracking fluids are injected directly into USDWs during normal
operations.167 A handful of fracking chemicals, including benzene and methanol,
may be injected into or close to USDWs in concentrations that threaten human
health.168 The concentration of these chemicals can be anywhere from four to nearly
thirteen thousand times the acceptable concentration in drinking water.169
Furthermore, the exact mixture of the chemicals is generally unknown. Public
records contain information about the most likely chemicals to be used, but beyond
that it is only speculation unless a state’s statute specifically requires that the exact
mixture be released to the public.170
The contamination of drinking water can be extremely hazardous. Health
problems to humans include increased fatigue, nausea, joint pain, and irritation of
the eyes, nose, throat, and skin.171 The overall quality of the water can decrease as
well. Increased levels of methane can cause frothing and bubbles in the water.172 In
some communities near fracking wells, residents can light their tap water on fire due
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to the increased levels of methane.173 Residents in the Black Warrior Basin of
Alabama claimed that their tap water had a milky white substance and strong odors
after fracking, while other residents found globs of black jelly-like grease that had a
petroleum smell.174 In the San Juan Basin located in Colorado and New Mexico, a
county employee found “explosive levels of methane” and “toxic levels of hydrogen
sulfide” in residents’ homes.175 Fracking fluids have also been correlated with the
death of plant and animal life.176
In light of these concerns with the contamination of drinking water supplies, it
would seem appropriate that fracking and the fluids therefrom be regulated under
the SDWA. However, that is not the case. The legal battle began when the Legal
Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. (LEAF) filed a petition with the EPA in
1997, asking for the rescission of the EPA’s approval of an Alabama UIC program,
which had been involved with unregulated methane gas fracking activities on eight
separate occasions.177 LEAF alleged that the regulation of state UIC programs under
the SDWA applied in this case, requiring Alabama to first obtain an authorized
permit before approving the operations.178 The EPA denied the petition, claiming
that fracking didn’t fall within the regulatory definition of “underground injection”
because the principal function of the fracking wells was not underground fluid
displacement.179 In response, LEAF contended that the narrow interpretation was
inconsistent with the SDWA regulations, and that fracking clearly had to be
regulated under state UIC programs due to the statutory definition of “underground
injections.”180 The court agreed with LEAF, finding that Congress had dictated that
all underground injection programs be regulated181 in order to achieve the purpose
of “prevent[ting] underground injection which endangers drinking water sources.”182
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Before the court could act to enforce its holding, Alabama revised its UIC
program.183 This gave the EPA the ability to approve the revised program under the
less restrictive § 1425 of the SDWA184 and effectively classify fracking activities as
separate from UIC regulation. LEAF challenged the EPA’s actions again, and the
Eleventh Circuit again ruled in favor of LEAF, holding that the “EPA must classify
hydraulic fracturing into one of the five specific SDWA categories for the clear
purpose of underground injection regulation.”185 This success was short-lived, as the
EPA and the oil and gas industry continued to search for ways around fracking
regulation.
In 2003, the EPA entered an agreement with three major oil and gas companies
that controlled 95% of the fracking industry, asking them to remove diesel fuel and
“other toxic substances” from the fluids being injected underground.186 The
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) established a voluntary arrangement between
the EPA and three major oil companies, wherein all agreeing companies had thirty
days from signing to terminate their use of diesel fuel in fracking processes.187
The MOA did not have the kind of regulatory authority as was originally hoped
for, and Congress officially exempted fracking from the SDWA two years later.188
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 amended §1421(d) of the SDWA, formally
excluding fracking from the statutory definition of underground injection.189 While
the EPA has established minimum standards that the state UIC programs must meet,
the risks that fracking poses to drinking water supplies are significant enough that
the fracking process should be regulated under federal law.
V. ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENTS
A. Infrastructure and Regulation Updates
The passing of the WIIN Act was a critical step in addressing the infrastructure
deficiencies of the nation, by providing grants to help update and replace aging
systems. However, the need for reform is much larger than replacing aged
infrastructure in a mere handful of impoverished communities. According to the
American Water Works Association, “an estimated $1 trillion is necessary to
183
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188
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by well injection; and excludes . . . the underground injection of fluids or propping agents
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maintain and expand service to meet [drinking water] demands over the next 25
years.”190
There is a total of one million miles of pipes across the country that deliver
drinking water, many of which were installed before the middle of the 20th century
with an approximate lifespan of 75–100 years.191 At the current rate that utilities are
replacing water pipes, it will take an estimated 200 years to replace the entire
system.192 As the pipes continue to age, there is an increased risk of corrosion,
rusting, and breaking.
One of the most concerning realities of aging pipes is the risk of water
contamination. Flint is certainly not the only U.S. city to experience contaminated
drinking water due to aged pipes. In 2015, an estimated eighteen million people were
served by PWSs that were in violation of the LCR.193 Offenses included failures to
report contamination to state officials and the public as well as failures to test the
water for lead or conditions that would result in lead contamination.194 In a study of
approximately 1,100 community water systems serving 3.9 million people, at least
10% of the homes tested showed lead levels over 15 ppb.195
Despite the hard evidence that demonstrates the widespread contamination
risks to drinking water, the EPA’s record for taking formal enforcement action
against violators has been scarce. According to their own data analyzing the reported
violations in 2015, the EPA only took formal action against 11.2% of infractions.196
This lack of accountability sends a message to service providers that compliance is
more of a suggestion rather than mandatory action. In order to prevent another
disaster like Flint, it is essential that the EPA and state agencies take action against
violators.
The enforcement of present regulation is fundamental to ensuring widespread
access to clean drinking water, as is updating the regulation that must be enforced.
In light of the Flint crisis, the EPA recognized that there was a compelling need to
revise the LCR in order to “strengthen its public health protections and to clarify its
implementation requirements to make it more effective and more readily
enforceable.”197 To be able to meet these objectives, the EPA is currently evaluating
recommendations from the National Drinking Water Advisory Council (NDWAC)
and other stakeholders on possible revisions to the LCR.198 Some of the principal
190
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recommendations that should be adopted to protect human health include the
implementation of a national lead service line replacement program, updated
corrosion control treatment requirements, and increasing transparency and
information shared with the public.199
The SDWA and the subsequent LCR have made significant progress in
monitoring and reducing the presence of lead and copper in drinking water supplies,
and in mandating the shift in materials used for new infrastructure and repairs. The
EPA should seriously take into consideration the NDWAC’s recommendations and
continue to revise these regulations in order to reduce exposure to hazardous
substances through outdated infrastructure.
B. Uniform Regulation for Oil & Gas Industry
Because fracking injects contaminants underground, sometimes directly into
groundwater sources, it should not be exempt from regulation under the SDWA.
While some states have individually implemented their own regulations regarding
fracking and its byproducts,200 they offer varying levels of protection without
uniformity. Underground water is not stagnant and the migration across state borders
is difficult to predict. Furthermore, fracking fluids left in a formation or
contaminates underground drinking water may remain there for decades, posing
risks for future generations.
The very purpose of the SDWA was to establish uniform standards for drinking
water in order to ensure the health of the nation.201 In particular, the UIC program
was created to protect underground sources of drinking water.202 Underground
injection is defined as “the subsurface emplacement of fluids by well injection,”
excluding the underground storage of natural gas, and since the amendment in 2005,
fracking fluids.203 In further explaining the purpose of the UIC program mandate,
the SDWA specifically states that “[u]nderground injection endangers drinking
water sources if such injection may result in the presence in underground water
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which supplies or can reasonably be expected to supply any public water system of
any contaminant . . . [that] may otherwise adversely affect the health of persons.”204
The exemption of fracking fluids from regulation under the UIC program is
erroneous. The fracking process falls neatly within the definition of ‘underground
injection,’ as one of the key steps to the process is the injection of the fluids
underground.205 Further, while the exact composition of the fracking fluid mixture
is generally unknown, the studies that have been conducted show that the fracking
fluids adversely affect human health.206 Exempting fracking from regulation under
the UIC program of the SDWA provides no benefit to the public—rather, the only
benefit provided is to the oil and gas operators who are left with one less federal
regulation to comply with during the course of their operations. The SDWA was
enacted to provide safe drinking water at the tap. Providing a benefit to industry by
exempting fracking from regulation does not fall neatly within the purpose of the
SDWA, and accordingly, the exemption should be repealed.
Additionally, elements of fracking fluids that pose a serious risk to public health
should be reconsidered. The SDWA still regulates diesel fuel in underground
injection processes, but diesel fuel is only one of many potentially hazardous
ingredients used. The risk of groundwater contamination from fracking fluids is
significant enough that the EPA needs to either strictly regulate their use or
implement an outright ban.
C. Increase the Number of Regulated Chemicals
Since the 1990s, the EPA has come close to successfully regulating only one
new contaminant.207 In 2011, the EPA announced its intention to set a federal
standard for perchlorate, a chemical found in rocket fuel and road flares known to
disrupt thyroid functions in humans.208 But since then, no federal action has actually
been taken. It is imperative that more regulations be established, especially
considering that tens of thousands of new chemicals have come into use since the
SDWA’s first inception.209
The slowing of the pace in regulating new chemicals is, in part, due to the
standards established in 1996. In refining the ‘regulatory treadmill,’ the new
guidelines resulted in the EPA having to move more deliberately in passing new
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regulations by having to “prove that there is a meaningful opportunity to improve
public health.”210 While there are obvious benefits to this approach of ensuring
sound science, those benefits are practically obsolete if no new regulations are being
enacted. The whole idea behind the SDWA was that it would be updated regularly
as more information came to light regarding contaminants.
Despite the challenge of having to navigate through these administrative hoops,
it is still no excuse for why some contaminants have not yet been listed. For a
chemical like perchlorate, there is ample evidence proving that it should be regulated
under the SDWA. Even trace amounts can be dangerous to human health, as it
prevents the thyroid from absorbing iodine, required to produce hormones critical
for brain development.211 California took action to regulate perchlorate in their
drinking water by setting a limit of 6 ppb, a concentration approximately equating
to mixing three teaspoons into an Olympic-sized swimming pool.212 Massachusetts
has set an even stricter standard of 2 ppb.213 However, the EPA has still not taken
action at a national level, despite having found the chemical in the drinking water of
forty-five states, as well as in the bodies of every single American who has been
tested for it.214 After the National Resources Defense Council filed a lawsuit in 2016
demanding results, the EPA signed a consent decree agreeing to finalize regulation
for perchlorate by the end of 2019.215 Until that regulation is adopted, perchlorate
remains unregulated at the federal level.
In order to address this major failure of the SDWA, it is essential to revisit the
procedural requirements currently in place. House Democrats have introduced a bill
that would do just that. The bill proposes to remove some of the procedural
requirements and mandates that the EPA set standards for a minimum of ten new
contaminants every three years, along with another measure to increase federal
funding.216 While the listing of new contaminants should continue to be based on
sound science, there must be a streamlined process to enable regulators to update the
list of contaminants accordingly. With updates to industrial and technological
processes nationwide, threats to the public health do not remain static year after year.
Accordingly, the regulations implemented to protect public health should not remain
static either. Furthermore, previous amendments to the SDWA mandated that the
list of regulated chemicals be routinely updated on a rolling basis, supporting the
idea that Congress intended these regulations to be systematically revised. The
mandate to periodically revisit the list of regulated chemicals should again be
implemented to ensure the safety of the nation’s drinking waters.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The SDWA was a major regulatory step in protecting the nation’s drinking
water and the public’s health. Creating a uniform set of regulations for levels of
viruses, bacteria, and chemicals ensured cleaner water for all citizens and ultimately
has allowed the United States to provide some of the cleanest water worldwide. The
revisions made in 1986, 1996, and 2016 have continued to expand the SDWA by
listing more contaminants for regulation as well as providing more federal funding
to assist water providers in meeting these objectives.
While there is no doubt that the SDWA has a host of successes, there is still
room to improve. The recent water crisis in Flint brought light to this fact,
uncovering a pattern of intransigence, unpreparedness, environmental injustice, and
ultimately, the government’s own unwillingness to take immediate action. There is
a need for more regulation to reduce lead levels in drinking water, including both
infrastructure updates and stricter enforcement against systems who are in breach.
Because of our aging infrastructure nationwide, it is necessary to acquire additional
funding to support these updates.
Furthermore, hydraulic fracturing needs to be regulated at a national level. The
threats that fracking poses both in the certainty that it can affect underground sources
of drinking water and the adverse effects to public health make it critical that
fracking be regulated under the SDWA. Fracking should be maintained once again
under the UIC provisions, and fracking fluid chemicals posing a serious risk to
human health need to be monitored, and in some cases, entirely banned.
Additionally, the SDWA needs to be consistently updated with more contaminants
that pose a health risk.
While the SDWA has transformed over the course of forty-five years into a
crucial regulatory tool for the nation’s drinking water supplies, it is essential that it
continue to be revised in order to meet the goal of providing clean and safe drinking
water to consumers.

